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When Politics Prevails: Parties, Elections and Loyalty in the European Parliament 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty 
in legislative votes. When casting their votes to make laws and to influence policy, legislators 
may therefore need to choose between principals. National parliamentarians, for instance, 
navigate the conflicting interests of their constituents and their party leadership; 
Europarliamentarians (MEPs) operate between their transnational and domestic parties. This 
paper explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between competing 
principals in multi-level systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative 
behaviour across democratic arenas.  
 
When casting their votes, legislators can face principals who disagree and compete; in such a 
scenario they must trade off delivering votes on legislation against sending political signals 
through defection. At the other end of the spectrum, legislators may approach a de facto ‘one-
principal scenario’. When principals’ preferences diverge, a one-principal set-up can occur 
because one of the principals prevails and/or one of the principals stops competing. We argue 
that the two scenarios are conditioned by the impact of electoral politics on the interests, 
incentives and risk perceptions of both legislators and their principals. Elections, we suggest, 
can ‘compress’ a competing principals scenario into a de facto one-principal set-up, because 
election proximity changes actors’ time horizons and political pressures and, thus, their cost-
benefit calculations around defection, around monitoring and controlling, as well as around 
sanctioning and accommodating.  
 
The European Union (EU)’s legislators choose between principals in a system of multi-level 
governance. As in all democracies, in this system, elections are defining events for political 
actors; in the EU, it is the domestic arena that remains democratically dominant, for both 
national and European elections. We suggest that the pressures generated by national politics 
and elections are a significant, but so far largely overlooked, explanation for legislative 
behaviour at the supranational level. In short, we ask: is there a reverse process at work to the 
well-established ‘second-order’ nature of EP elections? Do both European and national 
elections have ‘first-order’ importance for supranational political actors?   
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Empirically, we explore the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ 
‘collective disloyalty’ with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP).1 We argue 
that election proximity, both national and European (1) increases the attention 
Europarliamentarians pay to the domestic arena, in view of re-election to the EP and/or 
potential national office; (2) increases pressure on MEPs from their national political base, 
because ‘Europe’ becomes more visible domestically; and (3) makes the EP’s political groups 
less likely to sanction defection, given a vested interest in their constituent parties’ electoral 
success. Hence, we hypothesise that election proximity drives up delegations’ collective 
disloyalty. Under the ‘shadow’ of elections, legislative behaviour will be shaped by two 
additional factors: electoral rules and politicisation. Both factors, we argue, drive relations 
between MEPs and national parties, impact on the EU’s domestic visibility, and, therefore, 
influence incentives and behaviour during campaigns. Before elections, we expect particularly 
high disloyalty if delegations come from member states with party-centred electoral rules, and 
if Europe is contested.   
 
We test our hypotheses on a new dataset with roll-call votes cast by delegations in EP 
plenaries across three parliamentary terms (July 1999-July 2014). The dataset incorporates 
votes on the whole text under the ordinary legislative procedure (codecision) and gives us 
112,163 observations. Most importantly, we demonstrate that elections matter: the proximity 
of planned national and European elections drives up delegations’ collective disloyalty. As 
expected, this is the case particularly for delegations from party-centred member states. Our 
results also support a ‘politicisation effect’. Overall, delegations have become more loyal over 
time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest 
Parliament analysed—EP7 (2009-2014), which saw the EU’s politicisation increase against 
the backdrop of the eurozone crisis, a Eurosceptic surge, and the Spitzenkandidaten process.  
 
Our analysis contributes to the wider literatures on legislative behaviour, comparative 
federalism and multi-level governance in three ways. First, we theorise multi-level electoral 
politics, played out under diverse domestic rules, as an explanation of voting choice and party 
unity in scenarios where competing principals are ‘institutionally empowered to place 
demands on legislators’ (Carey 2009:2-3). In doing so, we introduce dynamic political factors 
                                                     
1 We use the terms ‘national party delegation’, ‘national delegation’ or ‘delegation’ to denote MEPs 
from the same national party represented in the EP (e.g., MEPs from the German SPD); ‘national 
party’ refers to the party organisation at the domestic level (e.g., the SPD in Germany); and ‘political 
group’ denotes the transnational political party in the EP (e.g., the Socialists & Democrats).  
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as determinants of legislators’ strategic motivations and behavioural choices. Second, we 
theorise the conditions under which such political factors—including contestation over 
Europe—work across levels of governance. Comparative federalists and EU scholars share an 
interest in regional and European elections as second-order contests (Thorlakson 2017); we 
complement their focus by explaining how political conflict ‘travels’ across democratic 
arenas in multi-level systems, potentially exerting first-order effects on legislative behaviour 
and political representation. Finally, a deeper understanding of electoral pressures and multi-
level politics speaks to scholars with a general interest in how electoral cycles shape political, 
legislative and diplomatic behaviour—in national, supranational and global governance.  
 
Scholars of comparative politics have analysed how formal institutions and party-specific 
factors drive party unity and legislators’ choice between multiple principals, both across 
countries (e.g., Carey 2007; 2009) and within (e.g., Sieberer 2015; Kirkland & Harden 2016). 
Likewise, extensive work on EU legislative politics has explained the cohesion of the EP’s 
political groups (e.g., Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2007; Ringe 2010) as well as defection by 
national delegations (Faas 2003) and individual MEPs (e.g., Klüver & Spoon 2015; Finke 
2016). Yet, these studies, of the EP and beyond, have mainly focused on institutional, party-
organisational, ideological and file-level determinants, with dynamic political factors 
deserving more systematic attention. 
 
Electoral politics is a key such factor. Comparativists have shown a link between election 
proximity and party (dis)unity in national democracies (e.g., Levitt 1996; Skjæveland 1999; 
Traber et al. 2014). Similarly, EU scholars have explored how pending European elections 
impact on the timing, output and characteristics of EU legislation (Kovats 2009; Crombez & 
Hix 2015), on the cohesion of the EP’s political groups (Lindstädt et al. 2011), and on MEPs’ 
defection (Meserve et al. 2017); recent studies also demonstrate that national parties’ issue 
salience impacts on MEPs’ voting behaviour (Klüver & Spoon 2015; Costello & Thomson 
2016). However, the impact of national elections on the EU’s actors, negotiations and 
decision-making has been surprisingly under-explored (but see Schneider 2013 and Kleine & 
Minaudier 2017 on intergovernmental negotiation). By drawing on European and national 
electoral politics to explain delegations’ (dis)loyalty, we thus add a multi-level dimension to 
the fast-developing scholarship on how European elections impact on voting behaviour in the 
EP, and on how national elections affect voting unity in the domestic democratic arena.  
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Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which politics travels across the EU’s multi-level 
system: EP elections may be second-order national contests (e.g., Schmitt 2005), but the 
political pressures generated by elections—national and European—in the domestic arena 
may well have a first-order effect on national parties in the EP, and increasingly so. Indeed, 
the EU, along with global governance, has become more politicised and contested (e.g., 
Grande & Kriesi 2014; Zürn et al. 2012)—through a string of lost referenda, the eurozone 
crisis, contentious austerity politics, and rising Euroscepticism. Political and academic debate 
has explored politicisation and its consequences, for the EU’s institutions (e.g., Hobolt 2014) 
and, top-down, for national elections, parties and public opinion (e.g., Hoeglinger 2016). 
However, we know little about whether and how contestation over Europe shapes 
supranational decision-making bottom-up, by ‘punctuating’ the behaviour of policy-seeking 
actors. Our paper contributes to closing this gap.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops our theoretical argument; we test 
two main hypotheses about the impact of national and European election proximity, and two 
interactions exploring the effect of elections conditioned by electoral rules and by increasing 
politicisation. Section 3 introduces our dataset and explains the operationalisation of our 
variables. Section 4 discusses our statistical models and empirical results. Section 5 concludes 
and assesses the wider implications of our findings for the study of legislators’ choice 
between competing principals and of political pressures in multi-level democracies. 
 
2. WHEN POLITICS TRUMPS LOYALTY: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Legislative voting in the EU is well-suited to analyse behaviour under competing principals. 
Europarliamentarians serve two principals: the national party nominates candidates for 
(re)election to the EP and is instrumental for future office, should the MEP return to the 
national arena; the European group controls a range of offices and benefits, including 
committee membership, chairmanships, positions in the group hierarchy, rapporteurships and 
speaking time (Kreppel 2002:202ff., 198ff.; Corbett et al. 2016). When their principals 
disagree and compete, legislators face a trade-off between ‘communicating’ their positions 
(by voting with their domestic party) and ‘deciding’ (by delivering the transnational majority) 
(Hix et al. 2007:89f.; for the general argument see Piketty 2000).  
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Europarliamentarians from the same national party form EP delegations, which serve as 
political conduits between the domestic and the European democratic arenas. We analyse 
when and why delegations choose to collectively communicate or decide in legislative votes, 
and, hence, are collectively disloyal or loyal with their EP groups (see also Faas 2003). Under 
some conditions, pressure from domestic parties will be unrivalled, with MEPs approximating 
a one-principal scenario. Under other conditions, the multiple principals problem will ‘bite’, 
because the transnational groups assert themselves. We expect more collective disloyalty in 
the first scenario than in the second, and we expect the scenarios to be conditioned by 
electoral cycles, especially in interaction with electoral rules and politicisation.  
 
Our argument works on three levels. First, an individual legislator is driven by re-election into 
the EP and by future national office. Since the success of national parties is key to these 
prospects, the domestic arena dominates an MEP’s strategic considerations before both 
national and European elections. Second, a national party’s willingness to monitor and control 
MEPs is determined by the public visibility of Europe as a domestic issue; visibility increases 
before a country votes. Third, given the weak electoral connection between Europarties and 
the electorate, the EP’s groups are policy- rather than vote-seeking. Hence, their motivation to 
either sanction or accommodate defection depends on the perceived trade-offs in the EU’s 
bicameral law-making. Disciplining defectors may carry one-off legislative votes; 
accommodating domestic concerns may increase a constituent party’s electoral chances. 
‘Sacrificing’ legislative votes in the short-term may thus gain policy-seeking groups more 
favourable bicameral cooperation in the long-term. In sum, in the shadow of an election, the 
competition between principals over votes—if not over policy-substance—should decrease, in 
particular over delegations from countries with party-centred electoral rules, and when 
contestation over Europe is high.  
 
The proximity of elections 
 
Elections are the defining political events in democracies. Electoral cycles impact on policy 
outputs and political behaviour by structuring the political agenda, and by defining 
politicians’ and voters’ interests, incentives and time horizons (Linz 1998; Jennings & 
Wlezien 2016). Comparativists have, accordingly, complemented the established literature on 
‘political business cycles’ (e.g., Nordhaus 1975; Schultz 1995) by analysing how national 
elections impact on political parties’ legislative behaviour. Levitt (1996), for instance, sees 
 6 
 
the link between US senators and their political parties decrease as elections approach; 
Skjæveland (1999) shows party cohesion in Denmark peaking just after as well as in the run-
up to elections; and Traber et al. (2014) demonstrate that some parties in the Swiss Lower 
House become more cohesive before elections, conditioned by the vote’s importance and 
visibility. For the EU, Lindstädt et al. (2011) argue and find that national parties’ influence 
over their Europarliamentarians varies across the EP’s cycle; between 1999 and 2004 the 
cohesion of political groups was, indeed, strongest mid-term and weakest close to the 
European election. Meserve et al. (2017) show that electoral volatility in EP elections—at 
member state level, between 1984 and 2009—increased MEPs’ attention to the domestic 
arena, strengthened the dominance of the national party principal and, accordingly, drove up 
individual defection.  
 
The above studies investigate the impact of election proximity at one level of governance; 
Lindstädt et al. explicitly dismiss—but do not test—any possible cross-level impact of 
upcoming national elections (2011:40). Yet, comparative work shows that a country’s multi-
level structure matters for legislative and political behaviour: for instance, parties’ unity is 
marginally lower in federal than in unitary political systems (Carey 2007), and economic 
voting is weakened by multi-level governance and by fiscal decentralisation in particular 
(Anderson 2006). In a similar vein, we argue that electoral politics travels not only within but 
across levels of governance, and that such ‘travelling’ intensifies with election proximity. 
 
Indeed, with European or national elections approaching in their home country, domestic 
politics should feature more prominently in MEPs’ strategic calculations, because the 
electoral success of their national party matters. First, national parties select EP candidates 
and, given the weak electoral connection between Europarties and the electorate, it is the 
national party that wins or loses the vote in EP elections (Schmitt 2005). Second, office-
seeking MEPs may consider the possibility of obtaining a post in the incoming national 
government and/or parliament. Motivated directly by re-election (via EP elections), or 
indirectly by the quest for office (via national elections), sitting Europarliamentarians should, 
therefore, support—or, at least, not undermine—their domestic base during a campaign (see 
also Traber et al. 2014:198-199).  
 
In turn, prior to an election, EU policy-making should become more important for the 
national principal. During these periods, parties are exposed to much greater scrutiny by the 
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public, the media and the opposition—on all political issues, including congruence with their 
EP delegations (see also Lindstädt et al. 2011:39; 41-47; Meserve et al. 2017:10). National 
media rarely scrutinise EU law-making, but the defection of a delegation from its domestic 
base makes ‘headlines’—especially before an election (Lindstädt et al. 2011:45), and 
especially when a delegation’s (dis)loyalty is collective, as is the standard case in the EP. To 
minimise electoral loss through perceived inconsistencies, and to capitalise on positive 
visibility between national agendas and EU-level voting, the domestic leadership is, therefore, 
more likely before elections than in everyday politics to monitor MEPs and to intensify 
bottom-up pressure (cf. Faas 2003:843; Lindstädt et al. 2011:44-45; Meserve et al. 2017:10). 
A similar mechanism has been identified in political parties divided on the issue of Europe: 
before an election, when vote-seeking becomes the dominant motivation and inconsistent 
messaging a risk to success, the leadership suppresses intra-party conflict more effectively 
(Hellström & Blomgren:268, 269, 279). Evidence of intensifying national control before 
European elections also comes from the formal analysis of legislative voting in EP5 
(Lindstädt et al. 2011); the pressure put on the Bulgarian Socialist delegation during the 
salient vote on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a recent 
illustration of close party control in the run-up to a national election (Euractiv 2016).  
 
Finally, before elections, the European principal re-focuses attention to the domestic arena 
and is less likely to sanction collective disloyalty. Political groups are, first and foremost, 
policy-seeking (Hix et al. 2007:32-53), and cohesion allows them to deliver legislation. Yet, 
upcoming elections punctuate their strategic calculations—and not only to see supportive 
MEPs re-elected (Lindstädt et al. 2011:39-40). EU laws are adopted in a bicameral system, 
and while European elections determine the EP’s composition, national elections influence 
the composition of the EP’s co-legislator, the intergovernmental Council of the European 
Union. Co-deciding legislation is easier the more politically aligned the Parliament and 
Council (Costello & Thomson 2016), and transnational groups can expect positive spill-overs 
into the next European election from their constituent parties’ national electoral success.  
 
In addition, accommodating fundamental domestic concerns is an established feature of the 
EU’s informal governance (Kleine 2013). At no point should the demand for visible 
accommodation be greater than prior to an election, and at no point should the importance of 
accommodation be clearer, given EP groups’ direct and indirect interest in their delegations’ 
electoral success ‘at home’. Politicians from the same party family may go as far as trying to 
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increase each other’s positive visibility across levels, even at the cost of some disloyal votes 
(cf. Schneider 2013:453-454; 459-460). Election proximity thus turns the ‘policy risk’ of a 
defecting delegation into a potential political asset—because European elections, fought at the 
national level, define the transnational group’s political strength, and because the asymmetry 
of national electoral cycles allows groups to prioritise their constituent parties’ success.  
 
In sum, before elections, delegations’ incentives for collective signalling increase, domestic 
pressures on these delegations rise, and defection becomes less ‘risky’. We therefore submit:  
 
H1  The closer a national election in a member state, the more collectively disloyal will the 
country’s delegations be in the EP.  
H2  The closer a European election, the more collectively disloyal will delegations be in 
the EP.  
 
The impact of electoral rules  
 
Elections are held under different laws across EU member states. Rules range from the highly 
party-centred to the highly candidate-centred, depending on ballot access, ballot structure, 
ballot type and district magnitude (Carey & Shugart 1995; Farrell & Scully 2007). Intra- and 
inter-party competition plays out differently under different rules (Renwick & Pilet 2016)—
impacting on citizens’ voting behaviour (for an overview, see Dassonneville et al. 2017), the 
stability of voters’ preferences across the electoral cycle (Jennings & Wlezien 2016), and the 
incentives for legislators and parliamentary candidates to prioritise their personal versus their 
parties’ reputation (Carey & Shugart 1995). These incentives, we argue, are key to explaining 
the degree to which electoral proximity shapes both legislators’ (dis)loyalty and their political 
principals’ control across levels of governance.  
 
In highly personalised systems, voters’ choices directly affect a candidate’s electoral success, 
thus incentivising personalised campaigns, high local visibility and ‘self-promotion’ (Carey & 
Shugart 1995:419-420; Hix 2004:197-198; Depauw & Martin 2009:106-108; but see André et 
al. 2015). Legislators pursuing (re)election should therefore ‘cultivate’ and prioritise personal 
reputation as a resource in campaigns that focus predominantly on individual representatives 
and involve competition within as well as between parties (Söderlund 2016:323-325). In 
party-centred systems, by contrast, a candidate’s electoral success is more immediately 
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affected by their political party—by the party’s leadership at the point of candidate selection, 
by the party’s consistent ‘messaging’ during a campaign, and by the party’s ‘brand’ in the 
ballot box (Carey & Shugart 1995:419-420; Depauw & Martin 2009:106-108). Under party-
centred electoral rules, intra-party competition should be absent (Söderlund 2016:323), and 
vote-seeking candidates should focus on toeing their leadership’s line and on promoting their 
party’s reputation (Hix 2004:196).  
 
Comparative research offers mixed evidence on how electoral rules impact on legislative 
voting and party unity in day-to-day decision-making (for overviews, see Depauw & Martin 
2009; Martin 2014:468I-469II). Studies of legislative behaviour in the EU, however, 
consistently show that the national principal is more important for MEPs from party-centred 
member states (Faas 2003; Hix 2004; Finke 2016). We focus, more specifically, on the effect 
of electoral rules on (dis)loyalty during campaign periods. As argued above, election 
proximity generates specific behavioural incentives across the EU’s multi-level system: 
MEPs’ strategic calculations turn ‘domestic’, while national parties up their interest in—and 
control of—Europarliamentarians. These incentives should be particularly pronounced when 
upcoming elections are held under party-centred rules. Indeed, where elections are won and 
lost by party brand rather than by personal reputation, a political party’s positive image and 
visible coherence across all levels of governance—regional, national, European—should 
matter more than under conditions of high personalisation. With no intra-party competition in 
the ballot box, parliamentarians across arenas stand to gain collectively from a clearly 
communicated political campaign—if need be, in delimitation from their transnational group. 
 
In sum, as elections approach, MEPs from countries with party-centred electoral rules are 
particularly dependent on their national party’s leadership and political brand; parties 
campaigning under such rules benefit most from visibly coherent signalling across levels; and 
EP groups should reduce pressure on delegations from countries where votes are primarily 
won by parties rather than candidates. We therefore submit:  
 
H3  Collective disloyalty before national elections will be particularly high for delegations 
from member states with party-centred electoral rules.  
H4  Collective disloyalty before European elections will be particularly high for 
delegations from member states with party-centred electoral rules.  
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The politicisation of Europe 
 
Finally, the domestic visibility and public scrutiny of Europe will increase with politicisation 
and contestation. It is well-established that the ‘permissive consensus’ of the first decades of 
integration has given way to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks 2009); that the EU 
has become more fundamentally contested in national politics; and that national politics is 
gaining importance in the EU’s multi-level system. A gradual development since the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, dissensus intensified dramatically in EP7: the contentious politics around 
the eurozone crisis and macroeconomic governance made the relevance of supranational 
decisions more visible domestically; Euroscepticism increased across the continent, 
particularly at the edges of party systems; and the Spitzenkandidaten process deliberately 
attempted to increase public debate and political choice prior to the 2014 EP election 
(Stratham & Trenz 2015; Conti 2014; Hobolt 2014). The EU became challenged in domestic 
public opinion and elections alike (Hoeglinger 2016), and referenda—on the Greek bail-out in 
July 2015, on the UK’s EU membership in June 2016—not only rejected the EU but were 
highly adversarial. 
 
With Europe increasingly visible domestically, the EP’s delegations should come under 
tighter scrutiny. Campaigning under politicised conditions, national parties should be 
particularly willing to monitor and control their MEPs—to score political points, to show 
their cohesive support of (or opposition to) the European project, and to publicly demonstrate 
‘closed ranks’ across party levels (see also Traber et al. 2014:198). In short, national parties 
will try to exploit the domestic attention paid to EU-level issues, stepping up the pressure on 
their Europarliamentarians accordingly. In turn, MEPs—selected by national parties and (re-) 
elected by national voters—should be more willing to follow their national base, even if this 
requires collective disloyalty. Finally, transnational groups are more likely to condone rather 
than sanction disloyalty if it is collective and emanates from genuine domestic concern. 
‘Appeasing’ voters in the run-up to a politicised election clearly falls into this category; 
during such periods, Europarties may benefit from their delegations’ disloyal signalling. 
 
In sum, before elections in a politicised Union, delegations will be particularly motivated to 
signal collectively; domestic pressures on delegations will rise; and MEPs can expect a degree 
of leniency—and a reduced risk of sanctions—from their EP groups. We therefore submit: 
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H5  Delegations’ collective disloyalty before national elections will be particularly high 
during EP7.  
H6  Delegations’ collective disloyalty before European elections will be particularly high 
before the 2014 vote. 
 
3.  DATA AND OPERATIONALISATION 
 
We test our hypotheses on a new dataset with roll-call votes cast by delegations in EP 
plenaries. Our data cover the period July 1999 to July 2014, thus including three legislative 
terms: EP5 (1999-2004), EP6 (2004-2009) and EP7 (2009-2014). The dataset incorporates 
votes on the whole text under codecision; that is, votes on amended Commission proposals 
and legislative resolutions, but not on amendments. As amendments are more controversial 
than votes on the whole text (cf. Kreppel & Hix 2003), our selection represents the hardest 
case to find an effect of election proximity. Disloyalty scores in EP5 were calculated using 
Hix et al.’s roll-call data (2007); for the period after July 2004 we used VoteWatch data.  
 
As roll-calls only became mandatory for final legislative votes after a reform of the EP’s 
Rules of Procedure in 2009, our voting data are unevenly distributed. We have data for 104 
votes in EP5, 253 votes in EP6, and 471 votes in EP7. The overall number of observations in 
the dataset is much larger since the number of voting delegations ranges from a minimum of 
51 in EP5 to a maximum of 165 in EP7. For most files, there is only one recorded vote, 
typically cast at first reading; on a minority of files, we have more than one vote. Altogether, 
our data include 828 legislative votes embedded in 749 legislative files.   
 
As is well-established, roll-calls are not representative of the whole population of votes, 
because there are two other voting methods in the EP (‘show of hands’ and electronic voting). 
Before the 2009 reform, roll-calls had to be requested by a political group or at least forty 
MEPs (e.g., Carrubba et al. 2006), and roll-calls before 2009 were more likely on salient or 
divisive legislation (Yordanova & Mühlböck 2014). Since 2009, all final and single votes 
must be roll-calls. As our analysis includes votes cast between 1999 and 2014, the results for 
the most recent legislature may be somewhat biased. However, any such bias would lead us to 
underestimate the politicisation we expect to observe in EP7: given increased politicisation 
over Europe, the effect of election proximity should become stronger over time, while the 
inclusion of all roll-call votes in EP7 should reduce the effect.   
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Our dependent variable disloyalty is dichotomous. It takes the value of 1 when the majority of 
a delegation votes differently from the majority of its EP group, and the value of 0 when the 
majority votes with the group (Faas 2003:852).2 We computed disloyalty for all delegations 
within groups (excluding only the non-attached) for which voting data are available.3 In total, 
our main analyses include 112,163 observations, of which 104,141 have the value of 0 on 
disloyalty (92.9 percent), and 8,022 the value of 1 (7.15 percent). Hence, loyalty is clearly 
most common. Delegations tend to vote en bloc with or against their group. This makes a 
dichotomous operationalisation of disloyalty the most obvious choice (see Figure A in the 
Appendix), and demonstrates that disloyalty sends clear and unified party political signals. 
 
We computed the following explanatory variables. Proximity national elections (H1) is based 
on the number of days between a legislative vote in the EP and the next national election, 
including elections for the lower chamber of parliament and for directly elected presidents. 
For votes in the last period of EP7, the next election typically took place after the end of the 
parliamentary term. For elections that took place until summer 2016, we calculated proximity 
as described above; for others we used the expected election date. We log-transformed the 
proximity variable in order to account for its non-linear effect. That is, changes in election 
proximity will matter more as national elections get closer, while being less relevant in non-
electoral periods. The variable proximity EP elections—which captures EP electoral cycles 
(H2)—is calculated in the same way; that is, by log-transforming the number of days between 
a legislative vote and the next EP election. Both variables are reversed for more intuitive 
interpretation.  
 
Our main analyses exclude votes cast in the shadow of unplanned or ‘snap’ elections at the 
national level. These not only take place earlier than expected, but are also called at short 
notice. Such unforeseen elections should not influence legislative behaviour in the way 
planned elections do,4 and our theoretical argument should not straightforwardly apply. We 
therefore identified all unplanned elections between 1999 and 2014—26 elections in 15 
                                                     
2 When no majority is formed among a delegation’s members, but a majority does exist in the EP 
group, the delegation is considered to be disloyal. 
3 In some instances, not a single MEP from a delegation voted, either because all were absent or 
because those present chose not to turn out (rather than to abstain). 
4 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to this issue.  
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member states—and we treated votes cast by national delegations between an unplanned 
election and the previous (planned) election as missing (18,253 in total).5  
 
To validate our findings, we also operationalised our key independent variables as dummies 
capturing campaign periods. Stevenson and Vavreck (2000) show that national-level 
‘campaign effects’ are most visible in the six months before planned elections; our dummy 
national campaign therefore takes the value 1 for votes cast in the six months before 
parliamentary and presidential elections.6 The campaign period for EP elections is much 
shorter. For instance, the 2014 Europarty candidates for the Commission Presidency were 
only selected in early March for the EP elections in May. Furthermore, the deadline for 
member states’ electoral lists is, on average, about two months before the EP election, ranging 
from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 83 days.7 The variable EP campaign therefore takes 
the value of 1 for votes cast in the two months before EP elections. 
 
To assess the conditional effect of electoral rules, we computed two interaction terms with the 
variables party-centredness (national) (H3) and party-centredness (EP) (H4). The purpose is 
to classify electoral formulas according to their incentives for personal-vote seeking 
(candidate-centred systems) or party-reputation seeking (party-centred systems). We used two 
indices based on the original conceptualisation by Carey and Shugart (1995).8 For rules to 
elect national parliaments and presidents, we used the ‘index of personalisation’ (Johnson & 
Wallack 2008, updated by Schwindt-Bayer & Tavits 2016). It ranges from 1 to 13, with 13 
representing the most personalised, candidate-centred electoral system. Farrell and Scully’s 
(2007) ‘modified Shugart index’—ranging from 3 (most party-centred) to 9 (most candidate-
                                                     
5 We preferred this strategy to disregarding unplanned elections in our calculation of the number of 
days to the next (planned) election. The latter would have resulted in artificially long time periods 
between elections in countries with multiple unplanned elections (e.g., Greece during the eurozone 
crisis), thus leading to extremely low values on our proximity variable. Table D in the Appendix 
presents the main analyses including votes cast before unplanned elections (n=130,416).  The table 
serves as a robustness check, and compares the effect of proximity in models with and without votes 
before unplanned elections. As expected, the effect of national election proximity is weaker when 
including unplanned elections. 
6 In the main models with campaign dummies, we treat votes before unplanned elections as missing. 
Yet, we also ran the models with an adapted national campaign dummy which takes the value 1 for 
votes cast by delegations from countries with an upcoming unplanned election, between the date of the 
election announcement and the election date itself. Table E in the Appendix reports the results. As 
may be expected, the effect of the campaign period does not change substantively when including 
votes before unplanned elections, but it is slightly smaller (cf. Table 2). 
7 See the EP Resolution ‘Reform of the Electoral Law of the EU’, adopted on 11 November 2015. 
8 Table A in the Appendix lists the constitutive elements of the two measures. 
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centred)—is used to classify the rules for electing MEPs in member states.9 We expect party-
centredness to strengthen the effect of election proximity. To facilitate the interpretation of 
the results, we reversed the measures so that party-centred systems have the highest values.  
 
To test the conditional effect of the EU’s politicisation (H5 and H6), we use separate models 
for EP7 and the previous terms (EP5 and EP6). Given rising contestation over the eurozone 
crisis and macroeconomic governance reform, and the deliberate attempt to politicise the 
EU’s agenda via Spitzenkandidaten in 2014, we contrast EP7 with the former parliaments. We 
run separate analyses instead of using an interaction term for the proximity variables and EP7, 
because the latter would lead to rather high degrees of multicollinearity.10  
 
The analysis includes several controls. The first set captures party features. On legislative 
files ‘belonging’ to a delegation (rapporteur’s party), loyalty is expected to be higher. Parties 
in government (government party)—coded using the ParlGov dataset (Döring & Manow 
2016)—should also be more loyal, because they face greater pressure from their leaders to toe 
the line agreed in the Council (Hix et al. 2007:141). Finally, a greater distance between a 
national party and its EP group on the two key dimensions of contestation—left-right and 
anti-pro EU—should increase the delegation’s disloyalty. We used Euromanifesto data to 
capture national parties’ ideological positions (Braun et al. 2010; Bressanelli 2014). For the 
groups’ positions, we used the average of the positions of the constituent parties, weighted by 
the number of seats in the EP. We subsequently calculated the Euclidean distances between 
EP groups and national parties (Euclidean distance).11 
 
The following variables capture features of the legislative file. Early agreement measures 
whether a file resulted from an informal compromise between the co-legislators (Reh et al. 
2013:1127). In line with Bressanelli et al. (2016), we expect early agreement to reduce 
disloyalty. Duration is the number of months between the Commission proposal and the 
conclusion of the legislative process; this is used as a proxy for contestation, which should 
                                                     
9 Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia were coded by the authors. 
10 Had we used an interaction term combining our (continuous) proximity variables and an EP7 
dummy in a model including all controls and fixed effects, the variance inflation factor (VIF) would 
have been above 40 for the interaction term and the EP7 dummy in a national election proximity-
model, and just under 30 for the interaction term and the EP7 dummy in an EP election proximity-
model. In line with this, the tolerance levels for these variables are extremely low: under 0.03 and 
0.04, respectively.  
11 As we have missing data on several (mainly small) parties, either for the whole period or for one or 
more EP elections, we imputed the mean ideological positions of their political groups.  
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drive up disloyalty. A dummy for codification controls for files replacing legislation without 
substantive change; these should be uncontested. Issue salience measures the importance of 
EU legislation in member states. It is computed using Nexis Business and News, counting the 
number of times a piece of legislation was mentioned in selected English-, French-, German- 
and Italian-language newspapers. We updated the data by Reh et al. (2013) for EP7. We 
expect more loyalty on codification files, and less loyalty on salient files.  
 
We included three final measures. First, Euroscepticism captures public opinion on the EU 
across member states. Using Eurobarometer data, the variable is the percentage of 
respondents in each country who answered ‘fairly negative’ or ‘very negative’ to the question: 
‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’.12 Second, trend is used to capture changes in 
disloyalty over time, and is coded 0 for votes cast in 1999, 1 for votes in 2000, 2 for votes in 
2001, etc. Previous research shows the EP becoming increasingly cohesive (Hix et al. 2007); 
disloyalty should therefore decrease over time. Finally, amended proposal distinguishes 
between votes on the amended Commission proposal (coded as 1) and on the final, more 
formalistic, legislative resolution. Votes on the amended proposal (8 percent of our votes) are 
all cast at first reading, with some subject to a roll-call. The literature suggests that votes on 
the amended proposal are often used for political signalling (Bressanelli et al. 2016:100), and 
delegations should therefore be more disloyal on these. Table B in the Appendix summarises 
the operationalisation of all variables; Table C includes all summary statistics.  
 
4. ANALYSIS  
 
As our dependent variable disloyalty is dichotomous, we estimated binary logit models. These 
allow us to predict the likelihood of disloyalty given specific values on the explanatory 
variables. The tables report coefficients and odds ratios (eβ), followed later in the section by 
marginal effects. Marginal effects are useful to appreciate the substantive effect of an 
explanatory variable, while keeping the effect of other variables constant. Our data include a 
large number of observations per legislative vote, because we analyse votes cast by all 
delegations. In some cases, there is more than one vote per file. We therefore clustered the 
                                                     
12 As the question was not yet asked in 1999, we used the score of 2000 for the few votes cast in 1999. 
Scores vary per semester and country, but there is only one score in 2000 and 2001 as the relevant 
Eurobarometer question was asked only once in those years.  
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standard errors at the highest level: the legislative file.13 Moreover, as recommended for 
models with clustered data, we use robust standard errors (Long & Freese 2014:104). 
 
Election proximity and electoral rules 
 
First, we assess the effect of election proximity, followed by the interaction with party-
centredness (see Table 1). Model 1 includes our main variables—the proximity of national 
and EP elections—with fixed effects for political groups and countries (not reported). Model 
2 adds controls. Models 3 and 4 interact party-centredness with national election proximity, 
while Models 5 and 6 include the interaction with EP election proximity. Because of 
multicollinearity, country-fixed effects are not present together with party-centredness.14 
 
We expect disloyalty to increase as an election approaches (H1 and H2). Higher values on 
proximity indicate periods closer to elections; the expected sign for the effect on disloyalty is 
positive. As hypothesised, the effect of the proximity of national elections is in the right 
direction and robust, with the exception of Model 5.15 The effect of the proximity of EP 
elections is also in the right direction, and significant in most of the models, except for the 
most ‘basic’ model (Model 1).  
 
 
                                                     
13 The observations are clustered in files, groups and countries. These clusters are not nested. In 
principle, it is possible to cluster standard errors by file, group and country, but this is problematic 
because the number of group and country clusters is small (seven groups and a minimum of 15 
countries in the early years). There is no ideal approach for such a structure (Cameron & Miller 
2015:350). We 1) cluster the standard errors by file, and include file-level variables in the analyses; 2) 
use group-fixed effects in all models; and 3) include either country-level variables (electoral rules) or 
country-fixed effects. By using fixed effects, we may not control for all within-cluster correlation, but 
given the small number of group- and country-clusters, we believe this is most appropriate.  
14 When including country-fixed effects in Models 3 and 4, the VIF for party-centredness is well 
above 10, and the tolerance level well below 0.10. The other variables do not raise concerns. 
Similarly, adding country-fixed effects to Models 5 and 6 leads to very high VIF and very low 
tolerance levels for party-centredness and several country dummies.  
15 This is in line with Klüver and Spoon’s (2015) analysis of individual MEPs’ defection between 1979 
and 1999. Our preliminary analysis also suggests that MEPs’ turnout drops significantly as a national 
election approaches. This may mean that we underestimate the effect of national election proximity, 
because, first, more MEPs turning out during a national campaign might increase disloyalty further; 
and, second, those MEPs voting amidst high absenteeism may be the most loyal.  
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Table 1. The likelihood of disloyalty (1999-2014) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ 
Proximity national elections 0.04 (0.02)** 1.04 0.05 (0.02)*** 1.05 0.13 (0.03)*** 1.14 0.13 (0.03)*** 1.13 -0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.04 (0.02)** 1.05 
Proximity EP elections 0.03 (0.03) 1.03 0.09 (0.03)*** 1.10 0.05 (0.03)* 1.06 0.14 (0.03)*** 1.14 0.09 (0.04)*** 1.10 0.21 (0.04)*** 1.24 
             
Prox nat X party centred     0.03 (0.00)*** 1.03 0.02 (0.00)*** 1.02     
Party-centredness (national)     0.14 (0.03)*** 1.16 0.08 (0.03)*** 1.08     
Prox EP X party centred          0.01 (0.01) 1.01 0.02 (0.01)** 1.02 
Party-centredness (EP)         0.14 (0.05)*** 1.15 0.13 (0.05)*** 1.14 
             
Rapporteur’s party   -2.12 (0.51)*** 0.12   -2.15 (0.50)*** 0.12   -2.18 (0.50)*** 0.11 
Government party   -0.23 (0.04)*** 0.79   -0.19 (0.04)*** 0.83   -0.18 (0.04)*** 0.84 
Euclidean distance   0.02 (0.01) 1.02   0.01 (0.01) 1.01   0.01 (0.01) 1.01 
Early agreement   -0.11 (0.09) 0.89   -0.11 (0.08) 0.90   -0.11 (0.08) 0.89 
Duration   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 
Codification   -0.89 (0.12)*** 0.41   -0.83 (0.13)*** 0.44   -0.83 (0.12)*** 0.43 
Issue salience   0.20 (0.08)*** 1.22   0.19 (0.07)*** 1.21   0.19 (0.07)*** 1.21 
Euroscepticism   0.02 (0.00)*** 1.02   0.03 (0.00)*** 1.03   0.03 (0.00)*** 1.03 
Trend   -0.03 (0.01)** 0.97   -0.05 (0.01)*** 0.95   -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.94 
Amended proposal   0.46 (0.10)*** 1.58   0.43 (0.10)*** 1.54   0.44 (0.10)*** 1.55 
             
Constant –3.64 (0.30)*** 0.03 -3.49 (0.37)*** 0.03 –2.46 (0.25)*** 0.09 -2.17 (0.33)*** 0.11 -2.55 (0.24)*** 0.08 -1.94 (0.35)*** 0.14 
             
EPG dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes No No No No 
       
N 112,163 112,163 112,163 112,163 112,163 112,163 
Log-pseudolikelihood –23579.18 -23275.14 -24141.32 -23622.75 -24162.53 -23640.58 
Wald χ2 2803.52 3454.12 2279.24 3067.75 2136.72 3031.45 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by legislative file. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 1, which displays the real, unlogged values of proximity on the x-axis, shows that 
delegations are more disloyal before planned national elections, and before EP elections. In 
both cases, the curves become very steep a few months before elections are held. For instance, 
averaging other variables, the probability of a delegation being disloyal on a vote cast at the 
beginning of an EP term is about 5.9 percent; five weeks before the election, this probability 
increases to 9 percent. The figure also shows that proximate EP elections have a slightly 
stronger effect than proximate national votes. This may be because all MEPs standing for re-
election immediately depend on success in EP elections, but not all MEPs will have their eye 
on national office prior to a general election at home. In addition, while all national parties aim to 
gain parliamentary seats in national and European elections—and may be helped by cross-level 
consistency in this endeavour—not all national parties (and, by corollary, their MEPs) stand an equal 
chance of gaining office. In addition, not all national parties (and, by corollary, their MEPs) 
stand an equal chance of gaining government office. Closely related, political groups may 
loosen the reins even more before EP than before national elections, because they 
immediately depend on their composite parties’ electoral success. By contrast, their parties’ 
success in national elections brings more medium-term benefits, such as spill-overs into the 
next EP election or a more favourable composition of the Council.  
 
 
  
Figure 1. Election proximity and predicted disloyalty  
 
As Models 3 and 4 show, the interaction between national election proximity and party-
centredness is also strongly significant (H3). Upcoming national elections particularly 
increase the disloyalty of delegations from countries where electoral rules give the party 
leadership a greater role in candidate selection, and make the party brand more important in 
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campaigns. The interaction between EP election proximity and party-centredness is also in the 
expected direction (H4), but its effect is less robust to different model specifications. Figure 2 
shows that in the shadow of planned national and EP elections, delegations from the most 
party-centred countries appear to be under tighter control by their national party. The trend for 
party-centred systems displayed by the two graphs is positive. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. The effect of election proximity under different electoral rules (Models 3 and 5) 
 
These findings support our argument about the conditioning effect of party-centred electoral 
rules. However, Figure 2 also shows that delegations from candidate-centred countries 
become more loyal before national elections. We did not develop a specific expectation about 
the effect of candidate-centredness, but this result is puzzling and merits unpacking in future 
studies. Recent research has, indeed, begun to draw increasingly nuanced conclusions about 
the impact of electoral rules on legislators’ strategic behaviour, demonstrating, for instance, 
that the effect of party- versus candidate-centredness on constituency effort is mediated by a 
legislator’s electoral vulnerability (André et al. 2015). Another potential route worth 
exploring is pre-electoral absenteeism. We would expect MEPs who stand in national 
elections in candidate-centred countries to be more intensively involved in constituency-level 
campaigning and, therefore, to turn out less before elections. Accordingly, those MEPs who 
do turn out in Brussels or Strasbourg may cast their legislative votes for specific reasons—for 
instance, because they are particularly loyal to their EP group or particularly supportive of the 
legislation, or because uncertainty (and, hence, the need to signal) is low in their domestic 
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electoral arena (see Meserve et al. 2017 on how EP election volatility affects individual 
defection).16  
 
Turning to our controls (Table 1), the effects of rapporteur’s party and government party are 
as expected: delegations are less disloyal when they own the legislative file, and when their 
national party is in government. The effect of duration (in months)—our proxy for 
contestation—is small but significant: disloyalty is higher on files that take longer to adopt. 
The effects of codification, issue salience and Euroscepticism are also in the expected 
direction, and significant. The trend variable shows disloyalty decreasing over time. Finally, 
the large and positive effect for amended proposal suggests that delegations, indeed, use 
lower-stakes votes to signal to the domestic level. Only the effects for Euclidean distance and 
early agreement are in the expected direction but not significant.  
 
To assess the robustness of our findings, we ran additional tests with a dichotomous proximity 
variable. As Table 2 shows, disloyalty is significantly more likely in campaign periods before 
planned national and EP elections.17 The findings in the two models are fairly similar, but, 
here too, the effect of EP election proximity is considerably stronger when including controls. 
Also, in line with the above results, the effect is slightly stronger for EP election proximity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 An exhaustive analysis of turnout is outside the scope of this article. Yet, our own data, showing 
lower pre-electoral turnout by MEPs from candidate-centred countries, lend very cautious support to 
this argument.  
17 We did not include the interaction terms with electoral rules in these two models because of 
multicollinearity. In models with the national-level interaction, the VIF for party-centredness would be 
above 10, and the tolerance level below 0.10. In models with the EP interaction, the VIF for party-
centredness would be above 60, with extremely small tolerance levels. Also, there would be 
problematic VIF and tolerance levels for several country dummies.  
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Table 2. The likelihood of disloyalty (1999-2014), campaign effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ 
National campaign 0.12 (0.06)** 1.12 0.12 (0.06)** 1.13 
EP campaign 0.17 (0.08)** 1.19 0.27 (0.08)*** 1.31 
     
Rapporteur’s party   -2.12 (0.51)*** 0.12 
Government party   -0.23 (0.04)*** 0.79 
Euclidean distance   0.02 (0.01) 1.02 
Early agreement   -0.08 (0.09) 0.92 
Duration   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 
Codification   -0.86 (0.13)*** 0.42 
Issue salience   0.21 (0.07)*** 1.23 
Euroscepticism   0.02 (0.00)*** 1.02 
Trend   -0.03 (0.01)** 0.97 
Amended proposal   0.44 (0.10)*** 1.56 
     
Constant -4.12 (0.23)*** 0.02 -4.45 (0.27)*** 0.01 
     
EPG dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
   
N 112,163 112,163 
Log-pseudolikelihood -23570.21 -23275.67 
Wald χ2 2700.83 3460.26 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by legislative file; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
 
To better understand the substantive effect of the explanatory variables, Table 3 shows their 
marginal change calculated over the full range of values (corresponding to the discrete change 
for dichotomous variables like rapporteur and government party); other variables are held at 
their observed values. As proximity moves from its minimum to its maximum value 
(corresponding to the length of a parliamentary term), the probability of disloyalty increases 
on average by 2.7 percentage points for national elections, and by 3.1 percentage points for 
EP elections. Both effects are significant at the 0.01 percent level. The magnitude of the 
proximity effect is not dissimilar from that of other factors identified as relevant in the 
established literature on cohesion and defection in the EP. Moreover, disloyalty is a costly 
choice, which delegations take cautiously, rarely and collectively; this underscores the 
importance of the proximity effect. Being from a rapporteur’s or government party decreases 
the probability of disloyalty by 6.1 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively. Euroscepticism 
has the strongest effect: delegations from the most Eurosceptic countries are about 11 percent 
more likely to be disloyal. 
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Table 3. The magnitude of the effects on disloyalty 
Variable  Marginal change 
 (Min → Max) 
Proximity national elections 0.027** 
Proximity EP elections 0.031** 
Rapporteur -0.061** 
Government Party -0.011** 
Duration 0.093** 
Codification -0.036** 
Salience 0.039* 
Euroscepticism 
Trend 
Amended proposal 
0.110** 
-0.052** 
0.028** 
      Note: All entries from Model 4; **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Politicisation 
 
The models in Table 4 assess whether politicisation magnifies the effect of election 
proximity. We present fully specified models, including all control variables and fixed effects 
for groups and countries, and we compare EP7 to the previous two parliamentary terms.  
 
The effect of election proximity seems largely driven by the dynamics in EP7, for national 
elections (H5) and, even more so, for EP elections (H6). As argued above, the difference is 
likely to be underestimated: the analyses include all final votes cast in EP7, but only the 
requested (and thus more divisive) roll-call votes in EP5 and EP6. Looking at the first two 
models, the effect of proximity of national elections is only significant in EP7, while its effect 
in the previous two parliamentary terms is far from significant, though positive.18 The effect 
of EP election proximity is strong and highly significant in EP7 only: disloyalty became 
significantly more likely before the 2014 European election.  
 
                                                     
18 To be precise, the p-value for the effect of national election proximity in the second (EP7) model is 
0.055—just above the 5% level—while it is 0.522 in the first model (EP5-EP6). 
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Table 4. The effect of politicisation 
 
EP5-EP6 EP7 EP5-EP6 EP7 
 (1999-2009) (2009-2014) (1999-2009) (2009-2014) 
 Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ 
Proximity national 0.02 (0.04) 1.02 0.04 (0.02)* 1.04     
Proximity EP  -0.02 (0.06) 0.98 0.11 (0.03)*** 1.12     
         
Proximity national (dummy)     0.12 (0.11) 1.13 0.16 (0.06)*** 1.17 
Proximity EP (dummy)     0.06 (0.13) 1.07 0.32 (0.11)*** 1.38 
         
Rapporteur’s party -2.43 (0.74)*** 0.09 -1.93 (0.73)*** 0.14 -2.42 (0.74)*** 0.09 -1.95 (0.73)*** 0.14 
Government party -0.20 (0.06)*** 0.82 -0.29 (0.05)*** 0.75 -0.20 (0.06)*** 0.82 -0.28 (0.05)*** 0.75 
Euclidean distance 0.05 (0.02)*** 1.05 0.07 (0.01)*** 1.07 0.05 (0.02)*** 1.05 0.07 (0.01)*** 1.07 
Early agreement -0.29 (0.13)** 0.75 -0.07 (0.10) 0.93 -0.30 (0.13)** 0.74 -0.02 (0.10) 0.98 
Duration 0.01 (0.00) 1.01 0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 0.01 (0.00) 1.01 0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 
Codification -0.83 (0.12)*** 0.44 -1.32 (0.26)*** 0.27 -0.83 (0.12)*** 0.44 -1.37 (0.26)*** 0.25 
Issue salience 0.25 (0.09)*** 1.29 0.17 (0.15) 1.18 0.25 (0.09)*** 1.29 0.16 (0.15) 1.18 
Euroscepticism -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.02 (0.01)*** 1.02 -0.01 (0.02) 0.99 0.02 (0.01)*** 1.02 
Amended proposal 0.43 (0.11)*** 1.54 0.52 (0.23)** 1.68 0.44 (0.11)*** 1.56 0.49 (0.23)** 1.63 
         
Constant -3.58 (0.67)*** 0.02 -4.02 (0.46)*** 0.02 -3.65 (0.51)*** 0.03 -5.17 (0.36)*** 0.01 
         
EPG dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
N 44,659  67,504  44,659  67,504  
Log-pseudolikelihood -9790.37  -12928.356  -9789.30  -12928.64  
Wald χ2 1608.83  2490.42  1614.58  2548.98  
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by legislative file; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed)  
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The last two models in Table 4, which include dummies for campaign periods, further corroborate 
our findings. In the six months before national elections, delegations are significantly more likely to 
vote against their political group, by a 1.17 factor. Similarly, in the two months before EP elections, 
the likelihood of disloyalty is 1.38 times larger. The control variables show no major differences 
over time. The negative effect of early agreement in EP5 and EP6 is no longer significant in EP7, 
most probably because early agreements have become the norm, with little legislation agreed at 
second or third reading. Interestingly, Euroscepticism is only significant in EP7, while issue 
salience only matters in the early period. This may underline increasing contestation since mid-
2009, with opposition targeted at the EU as such—rather than at specific policies—affecting 
legislative behaviour.  
 
In sum, based on different operationalisations and model specifications, we find support for the 
hypothesised effect of election proximity, both national and European. This effect is stronger for 
delegations from party-centred electoral systems; these seem to incentivise parties to strive for 
visible coherence across levels of governance, not least by monitoring and controlling their MEPs. 
Moreover, contestation over Europe seems to have mattered before the 2014 EP election and, to a 
relatively lesser extent, in the lead-up to national elections since 2009.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
This study explored the political conditions under which legislators choose between competing 
principals in multi-level systems, with a focus on the impact of election proximity—national and 
European—on the EP’s delegations. Drawing from the established comparative and Europeanist 
literatures on competing principals, legislative voting and politicisation, we argued that elections 
shape legislators’ and parties’ time-horizons and political pressures and, thus, their cost-benefit 
calculations around defection, control, and accommodation. Elections are key political events in 
democracies, which, we suggested, can compress a competing principals scenario into a de facto 
one-principal set-up. We theorised election proximity as a main effect and as conditioned by two 
related political factors: party-centred electoral rules and the politicisation of Europe. Our 
hypotheses were tested on a new dataset including roll-call votes cast under codecision by 
delegations in EP plenaries between July 1999 and July 2014. 
 
Our analysis shows that both national and European elections matter: the EP’s delegations become 
significantly more disloyal when planned elections approach, and particularly so in the run-up to 
European elections. As expected, election proximity impacts particularly on delegations from 
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countries with party-centred electoral rules; we argued that national parties, campaigning in such 
systems, are more interested in the visible coherence of the party brand across levels of governance, 
and use their power to control and sanction Europarliamentarians. Our results also support a 
politicisation effect: in general, delegations have become more loyal over time, but during EP7—
with contestation over Europe increasing—elections cast a particularly prominent shadow over 
legislative behaviour. Finally, delegations are more disloyal on contested and salient legislation, on 
amended Commission proposals, and under Euroscepticism; by contrast, they are more loyal on 
codification files, when they own the report, and when their national party is in government. In a 
nutshell, we show that ‘politics matters’ across democratic arenas in the EU’s multi-level system, 
and this finding has implications for the study both of legislative behaviour under competing 
principals and of multi-level democracy—in the EU and beyond.  
 
Most generally, we demonstrate that complementing and interacting established explanations of 
legislative voting—institutional, party-organisational, ideological, file-level—with dynamic and 
multi-level political factors is fruitful. Our focus on collective legislative behaviour, on (electoral) 
politics, and on the interplay between democratic arenas could also illuminate political dynamics in 
other multi-level or federal systems, with their multiple—and competing—layers of party 
organisation, leadership and loyalty. The German Bundesrat—where Länder delegations are 
collectively accountable to both federal and regional parties, and where pressures change before 
federal and regional elections—springs to mind. By uncovering the interconnectedness between 
competitive arenas in a multi-level system, our research can also speak to scholarship on 
representation in comparative federalism.  
 
Turning to the EU’s legislative politics more specifically, in direct contrast to established 
expectations, national elections do matter for supranational actors and drive up collective signalling 
in EU legislative politics. For Europarliamentarians the domestic democratic arena seems to have 
first-order importance, and national electoral cycles have a direct—if temporally asymmetrical—
impact on supranational decision-making. However, the effect of upcoming EP elections is even 
stronger. This may not surprise: after all, European elections directly affect MEPs’ future office, 
and Europarliamentarians may, therefore, be even more invested in campaigning and signalling 
before these votes. In addition to uncovering a first-order importance of national elections for 
supranational actors, our findings, once again, underline the second-order nature of European 
contests. Indeed, only when EP elections are lost and won at home, and only when delegations are 
incentivised to not just campaign domestically but to also promote their national—rather than 
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European—party brand, does it pay to use EU-level votes as collective signals in support of 
campaigns led by national parties. The fact that election proximity matters in particular for MEPs 
from party-centred member states further supports this interpretation.  
 
We also show that the EP’s delegations are key players of multi-level politics and act as conduits 
between the domestic and the supranational democratic arenas. Delegations’ legislative voting—
loyal and disloyal—is highly collective and sensitive to domestic political pressures, including 
proximate elections and Eurosceptic public opinion. This suggests, in turn, that delegations 
contribute to translating their voters’ preferences into the EU policy-process; offer familiarity in 
representation; alert their domestic political base to EU-level developments; and communicate 
national concerns ‘upwards’. Delegations thus provide a crucial vertical link between two distinct 
democratic arenas, each relying on parties to aggregate voters’ preferences and to deliver public 
policy. Yet, if EP groups routinely ‘tolerate’ disloyalty in the run-up to elections so as to increase 
their chances of representation, the asymmetrical electoral cycles running across the Union also 
disrupt the horizontal development of a truly supranational party system.    
 
Finally, our analysis suggests that politicisation is at work in the EU, and increasingly so. As 
expected, disloyalty is particularly high before the 2014 EP election; collective signalling increases 
before national elections held since 2009 and, thus, during the EU’s most politicised parliamentary 
term; and disloyalty goes up in response to rising Euroscepticism. These findings are particularly 
important because the politicisation effect of 2014 is likely to be underestimated: our data include 
all roll-calls on final legislative votes in EP7 but only on more contested votes in EP5 and EP6. In 
short, the ‘arrival of politics’ to the EU’s multi-level system, and its travels across democratic 
arenas, has become visible in EP7 but may well become much more prominent in EP8 and beyond.  
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A. Coding of electoral systems in EP and national elections 
Component Farrell & Scully (2007) 
EP election rules 
Johnson & Wallack (2008) 
National election rules 
Ballot  1 Ballot access dominated 
by parties; voters may not 
disturb order of list 
2 Ballot access dominated 
by parties, but voters may 
disturb list 
3 Ballot access nearly 
unrestricted 
 
0 Parties control both 
access and order 
1 Parties control access but 
not order 
2 Parties control neither 
access nor order 
 
Vote  1 Vote for list only 
2 Vote is list or nominal, 
but list votes predominate 
3 Vote is nominal or list, 
but nominal votes 
predominate and pool to 
other candidates 
4 Vote is nominal only, but 
vote may pool or transfer 
to other candidates 
 
0 Voters have one vote for 
a party 
1 Voters can vote for a 
party or a candidate (as 
in open and flexible 
lists), where votes for a 
party or candidate are 
observationally 
equivalent, or where 
voters have multiple 
votes for multiple 
candidates 
2 Voters vote for one 
individual candidate           
District  1 District magnitude is 
greater than one, with 
Vote <3 
2 District magnitude is 
greater than one, with 
Vote>2, provided that 
Ballot>1 
 
 
Pool  0 Across all members in a 
district 
1 Across some but not all 
members in a district, or 
across fewer than 5% in 
a tier  
2 No pooling across 
candidates 
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Table B. Summary of the operationalisation 
Variable Expected 
direction 
Description Data source 
Proximity national elections + Number of days (logged) between 
the date of the vote in the EP and 
the date of parliamentary or 
presidential elections in the EU 
member countries. Reversed 
(times -1) 
www.parties-and-
elections-eu  
Proximity EP elections  + Number of days (logged) between 
the date of the vote in the EP and 
the date of the EP elections. 
Reversed (times -1) 
 
National campaign + Vote in the six months before the 
national elections (1) 
 
EP campaign + Vote in the two months before EP 
elections (1) 
 
Party centredness (national) + Party-centeredness of electoral 
rules for the lower/only chamber 
Schwindt-Bayer 
& Tavits (2016) 
Party centredness (EP) + Party-centeredness of electoral 
rules for EP elections 
Farrell & Scully 
(2007) 
Rapporteur’s party – The rapporteur belongs to a 
national party delegation (1)  
OEIL 
Government party – The national party is in 
government (1) 
ParlGov 
Euclidian distance + Euclidean distance between a 
national party and a political 
group on the left-right and the EU 
integration dimensions  
Euromanifestos 
Early agreement – Files concluded at first or early 
second reading, agreed informally  
OEIL 
 
Duration + Number of months between the 
Commission proposal and the 
conclusion of legislation 
OEIL 
Codification – Files replacing existing legislation 
without substantive changes 
OEIL  
Issue salience + Average number of articles 
naming a codecision file in 
English, French, German and 
Italian language newspapers 
LexisNexis 
Business & News 
Euroscepticism + Percentage of citizens for whom 
the EU has a fairly or very 
negative image 
Eurobarometer 
Trend – Time trend, by year  
Amended proposal + Vote on the amended Commission 
proposal (1)  
VoteWatch 
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Table C. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Disloyalty 0.07 0.26 0 1 112,163 
Proximity national elections 718.42 467.68 0 1825 112,163 
Proximity national elections (log & reversed) -6.24 1.02 -7.51 0 112,163 
Proximity EP elections 506.34 461.05 32 1732 112,163 
Proximity EP elections (log & reversed) -5.68 1.17 -7.46 -3.50 112,163 
National campaign  0.14 0.35 0 1 112,163 
EP campaign 0.15 0.36 0 1 112,163 
Party centredness (national) -4.45 3.63 -13 -1 112,163 
Party centredness (EP) -4.96 1.89 -9 -3 112,163 
Rapporteur’s party 0.01 0.08 0 1 112,163 
Government party 0.33 0.47 0 1 112,163 
Euclidean distance 2.62 1.61 0 11.63 112,163 
Early agreement 0.71 0.46 0 1 112,163 
Duration 19.60 10.66 1 121 112,163 
Codification 0.03 0.16 0 1 112,163 
Salience 0.12 0.39 0 3.1 112,163 
Euroscepticism 20.08 10.49 3.9 59.41 112,163 
Trend 11.08 3.59 0 15 112,163 
Amended proposal 0.08 0.27 0 1 112,163 
 
  
 36 
 
 
 
Figure A. Distribution of disloyalty  
 
Note: Disloyalty (our DV) of a national delegation to its political group has been presented here as a 
continuous variable bounded between 0 and 1. A party delegation is fully disloyal (1) when its 
members all vote against the political group. Disloyalty takes the value 0 when all the members of a 
national delegation vote with the political group majority (in other words, when the national 
delegation is loyal in its entirety). As Figure A very clearly shows, national delegations tend to vote 
en bloc, either against or with their political group (the high bars at the extremes of the scale). The 
frequency of voting options between 0 and 1 – with national delegations breaking up, and members 
voting in different ways – is much lower. 
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Table D. The likelihood of disloyalty (1999-2014), including unplanned elections 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ 
Proximity national elections 0.04 (0.02)** 1.04 0.04 (0.02)** 1.04 0.12 (0.02)*** 1.12 0.10 (0.02)*** 1.11 -0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.04 (0.02)*** 1.04 
Proximity EP elections 0.04 (0.03) 1.04 0.10 (0.03)*** 1.11 0.04 (0.03) 1.04 0.13 (0.03)*** 1.13 0.10 (0.03)*** 1.11 0.20 (0.04)*** 1.22 
             
Prox nat X party centred     0.02 (0.00)*** 1.03 0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01     
Party centredness (national)     0.12 (0.03)*** 1.13 0.05 (0.03)** 1.05     
Prox EP X party centred          0.02 (0.01)** 1.02 0.02 (0.01)** 1.02 
Party centredness (EP)         0.16 (0.05)*** 1.18 0.13 (0.05)*** 1.13 
             
Rapporteur’s party   -2.25 (0.50)*** 0.11   -2.28 (0.50)*** 0.10   -2.30 (0.50)*** 0.10 
Government party   -0.21 (0.04)*** 0.81   -0.19 (0.03)*** 0.82   -0.18 (0.03)*** 0.84 
Euclidean distance   -0.01 (0.01) 0.99   -0.01 (0.01) 0.99   -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 
Early agreement   -0.10 (0.08) 0.90   -0.10 (0.08) 0.91   -0.10 (0.08) 0.91 
Duration   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 
Codification   -1.00 (0.13)*** 0.37   -0.93 (0.13)*** 0.39   -0.94 (0.13)*** 0.39 
Issue salience   0.20 (0.07)*** 1.22   0.20 (0.07)*** 1.22   0.20 (0.07)*** 1.22 
Euroscepticism   0.02 (0.00)*** 1.02   0.03 (0.00)*** 1.03   0.03 (0.00)*** 1.03 
Trend   -0.04 (0.01)*** 0.97   -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.94   -0.06 (0.01)*** 0.94 
Amended proposal   0.44 (0.10)*** 1.55   0.42 (0.10)*** 1.52   0.42 (0.10)*** 1.53 
             
Constant -3.56 (0.26)*** 0.03 -3.42 (0.33)*** 0.03 -2.73 (0.23)*** 0.06 -2.33 (0.31)*** 0.10 -2.56 (0.23)*** 0.08 -2.00 (0.31)*** 0.14 
             
EPG dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes No No No No 
       
N 130,416 130,416 130,416 130,416 130,416 130,416 
Log-pseudolikelihood -27086.81 -26710.14 -27715.90 -27102.97 -27745.6 -27210.42 
Wald χ2 2990.42 3667.77 2333.64 3147.89 2203.58 3139.19 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by legislative file; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.1 (two-tailed test)
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Table E. The likelihood of disloyalty, campaign effects including unplanned elections 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef (SE) eβ Coef (SE) eβ 
National campaign 0.10 (0.05)** 1.11 0.10 (0.05)** 1.10 
EP campaign 0.19 (0.08)** 1.21 0.29 (0.08)*** 1.34 
     
Rapporteur’s party   -2.25 (0.50)*** 0.11 
Government party   -0.21 (0.04)*** 0.81 
Euclidean distance   -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 
Early agreement   -0.07 (0.08) 0.93 
Duration   0.01 (0.00)*** 1.01 
Codification   -0.97 (0.14)*** 0.38 
Issue salience   0.21 (0.07)*** 1.23 
Euroscepticism   0.02 (0.00)*** 1.02 
Trend   -0.03 (0.01)** 0.97 
Amended proposal   0.42 (0.10)*** 1.53 
     
Constant -4.03 (0.19)*** 0.02 -4.34 (0.24)*** 0.01 
     
EPG dummies Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
   
N 130,416 130,416 
Log-pseudolikelihood -27077.18 -26713.03 
Wald χ2 2907.44 3673.56 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by legislative file; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
